<IV. Ethik und Politik> Levinas: The Face of Otherness and the Ethics of Therapy by BINDEMAN, Steven
Title<IV. Ethik und Politik> Levinas: The Face of Otherness andthe Ethics of Therapy
Author(s)BINDEMAN, Steven




© 2006, Lehrstuhl für "Philosophy of Human and
Environmental Symbiosis" an der "Graduate School of Global
Environmental Studies", Kyoto University published by the
Chair of Philosophy of Human and Environmental Symbiosis,
Kyoto University
Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
Levinas: The Face of Otherness and the Ethics of Therapy 
By Steven BINDEMAN 
The face for Levinas is an opportunity for intentionally discovering affectivity, 
which is experienced as meaning through feeling. We thus "feel" responsible for the 
other when we find ourselves face-to-face with him or her. Such a confrontation 
discourages intellectual categorization and calls instead for an ethical commitment to 
preserve the uniqueness of the other. Levinas's consequent distinction between the 
defining categories of the Said and the authentic experience of Saying is especially 
noteworthy. lt will be applied here to the contrasting ways experimental and humanist 
psychologists approach the face and identity of the other, either as a thing to be 
recognized and studied, or as an occasion for transcendence. 
Levinas challenges us with his question, what does the face of the other ask of 
us? When we are under the affect of its gaze we recognize the infinite play of 
complexities on its surface. The transcendence of the experience drives us to act in an 
ethically responsible way. We learn to substitute ourselves for the other, and his or her 
needs become of paramount importance to us - even replacing our own in terms of 
priority. What we give value too changes as well. The things we measure, like beauty, 
wealth, intelligence, and status, either recede into the background or disappear 
completely. What takes their place are the things that can't be measured, including 
friendship, care, devotion, spirituality, justice, and love. According to Levinas, those 
who follow the agenda of measurement are the totalizers. They follow the metaphysics 
of ontology and develop egocentric systems of sameness around themselves. They 
violate their surroundings by their acts of measurement, which are also acts of 
violence. As Brian Schroeder puts it in his book Alatared Ground: "lt is precisely 
conceptuality itself that is the origin of violence" (Schroeder, 1996, 1 ). Conceptuality 
as a kind of measurement violates the alterity, the unknowable difference, of the other. 
By reducing difference to sameness, it leads to understanding, then control, and finally 
violence. The horrors of war, especially those of the 2oth century, can be seen as a 
consequence of this process. Those who follow the other path, the infinitizers, are the 
proponents of subjectivity. They pass through the expetiences of infinity and 
transcendence. Their universe is decentered, rooted in a heightened awareness of the 
radical difference of otherness. The other is not there for me, but rather the other way 
around. F or Levinas, I am here for the other. I believe that this stance is one of the most 
shocking, disorienting, and far-reaching ethical commitments in the entire history of 
philosophy. lts implications can be felt in the way we relate to community, language, 
politics, justice, divinity, and therapy. 
114 Steven BINDEMAN 
This disorientation is grounded in the experience of the face-to-face relation. 
When the self meets the other, face-to-face, what is the nature of this confrontation? 
Does it entail a special kind of listening, of hearing what the other has to say, perhaps 
through a privileged kind of dialogue? Or does it require instead a heightened kind of 
seeing, of looking at the other in a certain way, differently from how one might view 
for example an inanimate object? The answer of course is both. Levinas asserts that 
seeing the face of the other is not a matter of perception. To explain his point, 
perception belongs to the philosophical tradition of representation (part of what he calls 
the Said, with its tendency to possess, appropriate, reify, and totalize) which he is 
trying to avoid. Instead, he is pointing to a deeper kind of experience of the face of the 
other, part of what he calls the Saying. The face, then, should not be reduced to its 
physical aspects alone. However, it is not merely a metaphor for something else, either. 
The face of the other is real. In fact, the face-to-face relation starts with an awareness 
of the physical incarnation of the face. What Levinas is asking of us is a profound 
reconsideration of our perception of this face. When we recognize someone, when we 
say we know him or her, we have fallen into the habit of seeing as a kind of 
understanding. We need to learn how to see otherwise, in order to respect, morally 
speaking, the singularity and otherness of the other. We need to let the absolute foreign 
nature of the other astonish us. 
Seeing for Levinas is highly problematic. For example, the authority of the gaze 
is the application of theoretical consciousness onto the plane of the other. As David 
Michael Levin writes in his recent book The Philosopher '.s Gaze, "Seeing the other 
person as something, inevitably subjects the other to the violence of classification" 
(Levin, 1999, 247). For Levinas, we do not "see" the face since the face cannot be an 
object of knowledge. The face, rather, is a commandment to feel responsibility. The 
experience of the face of the other is also an opportunity for transcendence into infinity. 
Infinity though is forever outside the grasp of seeing. How to liberate philosophy from 
the domination of vision and reason may be Levinas's central dilemma. In his words, 
"what is needed is a thought for which the very metaphor of vision and aim is no langer 
legitimate" (Levinas, 1966, p. 155). Since reason demands lucidity, transparency, and 
visibility, it is a natural ally of light. Truth for Levinas must be located elsewhere. 
For Levinas, however, language, truth, and justice are intertwined. "Truth," he 
writes in his early major work Totality and lnfinity in a section entitled Rhetoric and 
Injustice "is produced only in veritable conversation or in justice" (Tal 71 ). He 
emphasizes in the same passage that "We call justice this face to face approach, in 
conversation" (his italics). Injustice in turn starts with rhetoric, the kind of discourse 
that violates the freedom of the other. Rhetoric itself cannot be the problem, however, 
since Levinas uses it himself, as a way of breaking through the boundaries of reason. 
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The problem rather is in the way that rhetoric is used. This way is found especially, he 
says, in "pedagogy, demagogy, and psychagogy" (Tal, 70), which are all systems of 
measurement and control. When ethics thus moves into the domain of politics and 
becomes morality, the possibility of violence appears because of the threat of the 
application of such absolutist forms of thought. Further, although the moral agent must 
remain free in order to avoid the totalizing domination of the state, morality must still 
be grounded in the ethical relation of the face-to-face. For Levinas justice is not an 
abstract notion but is found in the expression of duty and obligation discovered in the 
face of the other. When ethical discourse is grounded in the face to face relation so that 
the freedom of the other is respected and preserved, absolutist systems are thereby 
renounced. 
Justice for Levinas is still more complicated, though. Although every face is 
invisible to me even when facing me, it bespeaks its kinship with all other human 
beings however distant from me. With this insight Levinas passes from his 
development of an ethics between singular persons to a theory of justice related to the 
idea of kinship. Present to all face-to-face relations is the addition of what he points to 
as a kind of "third party,'' a condition that he calls "illeity." This third party acts as a 
witness to the proceedings. This addition brings up the issue of social standards, and 
along with it a serious problem for Levinas. He somehow has to pass over from the 
ethically grounded specificity of the face-to-face relation to the universality of the 
institution of justice. Can justice be fair and impartial on the one hand, yet on the other 
hand still be connected to the transcendence discovered on the face of the other? 
The encounter with the face is a dialogue in language grounded in ethics. "The 
face,'' Levinas says, "is a living presence .... The face speaks" (Tal, 66). Our encounter 
with the face awakens our moral conscience. lt obsesses us. lt also commands us to 
listen to its call. lt thus has an immediate and powerful presence, which however is at 
the same time an absence. When Heidegger interprets a phrase from Hölderlin, 
"poetically man dwells,'' he is talking about responding to a similar call. "Dwelling" 
for Heidegger suggests man's taking his own measure against the godhead, whereby his 
own mortality is measured against the immortality of God. In his essay on the 
Hölderlin poem Heidegger introduces two different kinds of measurement. The first is 
the measuring of science, which with a palpable stick or rod clutches at standards. The 
other is the measuring of poetry, which through a concentrated perception or gathering 
takes in the standard but remains a kind of listening. (See Heidegger, 1971, 223.) For 
Levinas the presence of the face speaks forth similarly in what he calls Substitution, the 
relationship of one for the other, in the non-presence of the infinite, through the call of 
responsibility. He clarifies this point in the following way: "This response answers, 
before any understanding, for a <lebt contracted before any freedom and before any 
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consciousness and any present, but it does answer, as though the invisible that bypasses 
the present left a trace by the very fact of bypassing the present" (OB 11-12). 
Levinas's description of the face as a presence that is also an absence, what he 
calls the trace, is an example of his ongoing struggle with language whereby he tries to 
say more that what can be merely said. Since the entire history of western philosophy is 
permeated with the language of ontology, Levinas's focus on experience outside this 
realm faces constant difficulties with articulation. This explains the title of his second 
and last major work: Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. When he speaks of "the 
invisible that bypasses the present" he is referring to God. Since his theology is a 
negative theology, however, this means that he believes that nothing positive can be 
known about God, who has nothing in common with any other being. His problem can 
also be explained in terms of the quest of phenomenology, which is the attempt to gain 
access to the originary or lived experience. Since all lived experience takes place 
within the constant shifting of time's passing, its fluid texture is forever beyond the 
grasp of conceptuality. A similar problem exists with poetry, as the poet Charles Simic 
indicated in a recent article [from The New York Review of Books, July 19, 2001, pp. 
34-36] entitled "That Elusive Something." "Paradoxically," Simic wrote, "what is most 
important in a poem, that something for which we go back to it again and again, cannot 
be articulated. The best one can do under the circumstances is to give the reader a hint 
of what one has experienced reading the poem, but was unable to name .... Poetry's 
strength lies in its endless elusiveness to the intellect." Levinas's constant use of 
rhetorical and poetic devices, even within the architecture of phenomenology - despite 
his criticism of them elsewhere -- can thus be explained in terms of the elusiveness yet 
constancy of his choice of subject matter. Although the domain of Levinas's 
philosophical efforts shifted over its course from ethics to theology, his focus 
throughout remained fixed on the elusive face-to-face experience. 
Levinas 's ethics, thus grounded in the originary experience of the face as a living 
presence, is an embodied ethics. The call of the other to feel responsibility for him or 
her takes hold of our flesh, affecting our gestures, and our listening, looking and seeing 
as well. This call is not to be understood through an intellectual or cognitive act, 
though; rather it is something to be feit. We feel the presence of the other through the 
experience of the face-to-face, and this felt experience has real meaning for us. The 
ethical subject is not determined by its freedom and autonomy (as it is in liberal 
humanism) but by being subjected to and attentive to this call. Freedom is for the other, 
not for oneself. As Levinas writes: "the Good is not presented to freedom; it has chosen 
me before I have chosen it. No one is good voluntarily" (OB 15). His ethics is not 
therefore based on the rights and responsibilities of a person with free will using 
rational principles, but on an embodied dimension that is prior to this. lt is a response 
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to a call that it is not yet heard by the ego. Although incomprehensible, befalling us 
from beyond essence, this call is still real. Levinas is referring, in his own words, to "a 
reason before the beginning, before any present, because my responsibility for the other 
commands me before any decision, before any deliberation" (OB 166). 
The ego is not yet able to hear the call of the other because the ego is attached to 
a mask. "Prior to the play of being," says Levinas, "before the present, older than the 
time of consciousness that is accessible in memory . . . the oneself is exposed as 
hypostasis, of which the being it is as an entity is but a mask." The "I," he continues, is 
at first a "no one, clothed with purely borrowed being, which masks its nameless 
singularity by conferring on it a role" (OB, 106). We discover our true moral self only 
by tearing off this mask and exposing our face to the face of the other. The mask we 
tear off is our socialized, artificially constructed identity, which gave us our name and 
protected us from disorientation and loss of self. However, it is only in this state of 
embodied vulnerability, beyond ego, that we are attentive to the other's call. 
The call of the other is disruptive. lt disintegrates egological identity and leaves 
it with nothing more than a nameless ipseity. lt calls into question the intentionality and 
primacy of consciousness. lt uproots the self from history and undermines its sense of 
freedom. lt leaves the self instead within an ethically grounded universe of obligation 
that is unending in its demands and asymmetrical in character. This means that the 
ethical demand to be good and just is not contingent on the other's reciprocity. Yet for 
Levinas, only this disinterested selflessness is "what is better than being, that is, the 
Good" (OB, 19). 
Levinas's work is disruptive in another sense, too. lt disrupts the movement 
towards certainty of the modern European philosophical tradition. This movement 
gives precedence to the atemporal mode of presence, since presence is what enables 
knowledge to take shape through the process of philosophical analysis. This quest for 
knowledge assumes that everything that is other (object, thing, or being) is in principle 
accessible or reducible to theoretical contemplation. Heidegger uses the term 
"presencing" to call attention to the need to emphasize in contrast the key role 
temporality plays in consciousness. With this term he refers to the event of 
appropriation whereby truth as unconcealment comes into the clearing opened up by 
the experience of authenticity. Authenticity in turn is discovered either through the 
exploration of certain artworks or with the increased awareness of one's own mortality. 
Within authenticity, one's personal time slows down. Presencing is being as time, or 
temporal coming-about (like in the unfolding of a cubist portrait where the identity of 
the subject is refracted and hidden), but presencing almost unnoticeably becomes 
"something present" when it is named or represented. The modernist reification and 
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totalization of presencing, found most noticeably in modern technology, is violent, 
anxiety driven, and defensive. As Levinas puts it, knowledge is what reduces the other 
to the same (see Levinas, 1966, p. 151). That which is both agent and container for this 
transmutation ( or what could also be called the shift from difference to identity) is 
variously called by the tradition ego, self, consciousness, mind, or Dasein. Its end 
result is nothing more than the reiteration of what one already knows, where nothing 
new, nor other, nor strange, nor transcendent, can appear or affect someone. Levinas 
attempts in its stead to develop a kind of alternative phenomenology based on the 
experience of transcendence, which, as a trace of the infinite, is discovered through the 
infinite variability on the face of the other within the face-to-face relation. 
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